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Corruption is often a source of contentious debate, covering different areas of knowledge, such 
as philosophy and sociology. In this paper we assess the effects of corruption on economic 
activity and highlight the relevance of the size of the government. We use dynamic models and 
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach for a panel of 48 countries, from 2012 
to 2019. We find an adverse effect of corruption on the level and growth of GDP per capita, but 
that large governments benefit less from reducing corruption. Furthermore, developing 
economies, regardless of government size, benefit less from reducing corruption, while 
government size is not sufficient to explain the influence of corruption on economic activity, 
although the level of effectiveness of public services is crucial. Finally, our findings suggest 
that private investment is a potential transmission channel for corruption. 
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The concept of corruption involves cultural, legal, philosophical, and economic aspects. 
Accordingly, the definition of corruption can vary depending on the research carried out, in 
function of the perception and subjectivity of the topic. For Tomaszewski (2018), industrialised 
and democratic countries have a different approach and perspective than other economies and 
cultures. However, in this study, we assume that corruption is the act of public agents in 
infringement of the laws and norms established to serve private interests, to the detriment of 
society. 
In the economic context, a key question is whether high levels of corruption can be partly 
responsible for the slowdown in economic growth. Furthermore, does the size of government 
interfere with the level or growth of economic activity? Is there a transmission channel for 
corruption to affect the economy? 
Despite important findings, there is no consensus in the literature regarding the determinants 
of corruption and its impact on economic activity. In this sense, corruption and its consequences 
have received considerable attention by international organisations and governments around 
the world, such as the development of governance indicators and specific laws and regulations 
to define and guide the conduct of public and private agents (Bação et al., 2019). 
Different international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), have increased their 
efforts to combat corruption through different programmes. For the UN, corruption not only 
distorts the decision of individuals and firms, but also constrains investment, inhibits 
competition, and hinders economic growth. For the World Bank (WB), the identification and 
control of corruption has assumed priority status in the political and institutional environment 
and for the need for reform over the last two decades. 
 
“These reforms build on the idea that corruption is a dysfunction of public 
administration that emerges in the presence of monopoly and discretion, which in turn 
can be curbed by promoting accountability and transparency. Corruption undermines 
policies and programs that aim to reduce poverty, so attacking corruption is critical to 
the achievement of the Bank’s overarching mission of poverty reduction.” (The World 
Bank, 2019). 
 
Despite these arguments, there is no clear convergence of results regarding the effects of 
corruption on economic activity. Different studies present two hypotheses to understand the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth. The first hypothesis describes 
corruption as an obstacle to economic growth. This hypothesis is described as “sanding the 
wheels” (Aidt, 2009; Nur-tegin and Jakee, 2020). 
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The other hypothesis shows a positive connection between corruption and economic growth: 
the “greasing the wheels” hypothesis. This positive relationship occurs in situations where there 
is excessive bureaucracy and inefficiencies which hinder the development of new businesses. 
Corruption is therefore seen as a “second best solution”, due to the distortions caused by the 
malfunctioning of public institutions. In other words, corruption can enhance economic growth 
when economic agents pay bribes to circumvent bureaucracy. 
Using a panel of 48 developed and developing countries for the period of 2012 to 2019, our 
study focusses on the response of economic activity to the effect of corruption, as measured by 
the corruption perception index (CPI). In addition, we investigate whether the size of the 
government interferes with this relationship.  
Our study thus contributes to the literature in several different ways: i) by offering new 
findings and filling a gap by reviewing the effects of corruption on economic activity, as many 
studies use the CPI before the methodological change (2012) and/or combining the data before 
and after this period. However, the scores are not comparable before 2012 (Gründler and 
Potrafke, 2019), and hence, ii) we analyse the effect of corruption (CPI) on the level and growth 
of economic activity, controlling for different configurations.  
First, based on dynamic models, we study the effect of corruption on the level and growth 
of GDP per capita (pc) for the full sample. Subsequently, we classified the countries into 
medium-big and small governments, the latter having a government spending-to-GDP ratio 
below 30%. In this way, we examine whether the size of the government matters. Second, we 
deepen the research and investigate whether the level of economic development makes 
countries susceptible to the effects of corruption. For this purpose, we initially use the full 
sample and then control for the level of economic development and government size. Third, for 
a full sample and, controlling for the size of governments and also the level of development, 
we examine whether the effectiveness of public services influences the effect of corruption on 
the level and growth of GDP pc. Finally, we analyse whether private investment is a potential 
transmission channel for corruption. 
Our results indicate that corruption is harmful to the economy and has an adverse effect on 
the level and growth of GDP pc, regardless of the government size. However, small 
governments fell more intense effects in reducing corruption than large governments. In 
addition, in developed economies with small governments, the reduction of corruption has a 
positive effect on GDP pc. On the other hand, in developing countries with small governments, 
the increase in corruption is positive or has no significant effect on GDP pc. We also note that, 
in developed economies with large governments, there is a negative relationship with 
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corruption, while that is not the case for developing economies. Lastly, we found that private 
investment declines with increasing corruption and can be a potential channel of transmission 
of corruption. We therefore found evidence that corruption disrupts firms’ decisions, interferes 
with the innovation process, and decreases both investment and economic activity. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. 
Section 3 presents the data and estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature 
Since the late 1990s governments have included combating corruption as one of their 
government goals, highlighting a phenomenon which for a long time has not received much 
attention. In the same vein, Abreu (2011) points out that economies have experienced an 
increase in events where corruption has been evident, after decades of flexibility and 
modernisation of expanded markets on a global scale. 
The literature provides at least two main reasons for associating government size with 
economic inefficiency and corruption. First, large governments can hinder economic growth. 
Some researchers point out that the size of the government is negatively related to growth of 
GDP, as they tend to consume resources from the economy without producing significant 
effects, while other studies indicate that there is an optimum level for the size of the government 
(Di Mateo, 2013; Dzumashev, 2014, Afonso and Schuknecht, 2019, and Afonso et al, 2020). 
Second, governments with a greater participation in the economy can be inefficient and, by 
interfering in different areas, they compete with and exclude private activities, which are more 
efficient in the opinion of some specialists. Such a scenario thus creates an environment which 
is conducive to corruption and inefficiencies in economic activity. Although many experts 
defend free markets as being the mechanism for allocating resources, Di Mateo (2013) argues 
that a considerable proportion of economic inputs is defined outside the market environment, 
and is therefore influenced by government institutions. For the author, the decision is not a 
trivial one, but there is a need to investigate why, when, and where resource allocation should 
take place. Once these questions are answered, we can then proceed to define the participation 
and role of government in economies. 
Due to the multidisciplinary nature of the question, scholars highlight the complexity and 
challenges which arise from the different perspectives of corruption. Hayashi (2012) highlights 
three dimensions of this phenomenon: legalist, mercantilist, and the concept of public good. 
For Bobbio et al. (1998), an aspect of corruption is associated with a transaction or deal between 
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at least two agents. There must be the corruptor and the corrupted, usually with the offer of a 
promise that favours the interests of the corruptor. The United Nations (UN) clearly defines the 
activities which it considers to be directly linked to corruption, such as bribery, fraud, 
embezzlement, nepotism, extortion, and the use of inside information by a public agent for 
private benefit (Hayashi, 2012). 
For different authors, these practices affect the level of economic activity and welfare (Mo, 
2001; Pulock, 2010), through the embezzlement of public funds or practices which acts as 
barriers to the entry of new firms into the markets, which consequently affects innovation and 
reduces productivity and economic growth. Ahmad et al. (2012) stress that over the last 30 
years, different studies point to corruption as being a factor which is capable of changing the 
goals of public institutions to benefit agents and private institutions. They emphasise that 
corruption can also inhibit investments, which in turn makes public administration more 
expensive for society. 
Mauro (1995) also suggests that corruption is negatively associated with economic growth 
and highlights that the direction of causality starts from corruption, rather than the other way 
around. This finding contradicts some arguments that there would be a “boomerang effect”, or 
that corruption can influence and be influenced by other variables. 
Heckelman and Powell (2010) indicate that the effects of corruption depend on the degree 
of development of national institutions. Using a different approach, based on regression 
analysis, and controlling the variable economic freedom, they argue that corruption fosters 
economic growth when economic freedom is restricted. On the other hand, as economic 
freedom is more present and robust, this positive effect decreases significantly. 
The empirical literature provides important results notably for developed countries, such 
as the United States and the European Union, although some are not conclusive. To expand the 
sample and bring new evidence, researchers have examined whether the effect of corruption 
varies in different regions and whether a country can affect its neighbours through the “spillover 
effect” of corruption. d’Agostino et al. (2016b) analysed African nations and found that a 
negative correlation between corruption and economic and economic activity. In the same vein, 
Huang (2016) found no positive effects of corruption on economic growth. 
These findings are in line with the most widely observed argument in newspapers and 
morally accepted and disseminated by governments and international institutions. Accordingly, 
these results support the hypothesis “sanding the wheels”, or that corruption slows down 
innovations, distorting the economic system, and it is therefore harmful for economic growth. 
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However, some studies point to opposite conclusions - where corruption is the driving force 
of economic growth (Leff, 1964). Kaufman and Wei (2000) considered that corruption can have 
a lubricating effect on economic gears in certain circumstances, which supports the “greasing 
the wheels” hypothesis. Their findings support the argument that corruption is beneficial to the 
economy, due to the excessive set of regulations, rules, and bureaucracies that render the system 
inefficient. In this sense, corruption acts to overcome these obstacles and stimulate economic 
growth.  
There is still the possibility of a hybrid behaviour between corruption and economic 
growth. Some economists argue that the relationship between variables has an inverted U shape, 
such as in countries in the early stages of economic and social development – where there is no 
fertile environment for corruption. During the intermediate stages of development, the 
opportunities for corruption increase, whereas corruption declines again in the case of a highly-
developed society (Ahmad et al., 2012). 
In addition, a frequent association is that governments with a high participation in the 
economy (“Big Governments”) are bureaucratic and inefficient, and are therefore a breeding 
ground for corruption. Some authors (Egger and Winner, 2005; Dzumashev, 2014) argue that 
corruption improves economic efficiency when the size of the government is above the ideal 
level. The choice of government size is a delicate issue and requires a sensitive balance. For 
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), the choice creates an impasse for policymakers, whereby small 
governments do not correct inequalities in the economic system, while a large government 
increases corruption. They also point out that public spending for low-income agents in 
developing countries is often misdirected, increasing corruption. 
In contrast, Kotera et al. (2012) identify a positive association between the size of the 
government and corruption, for democratic countries. Empirical papers have indicated that 
large governments can increase participation in the economy and still reduce corruption, as they 
have a system of checks and balances (Billger and Goel, 2009; La Porta et al., 1999). 
Bobbio et al. (1998) advocate that the greater the scope of institutionalisation, the higher 
the chances for the emergence of corruption. This is the cornerstone of the argument of the 
authors, who point out that greater government participation in relation to the private sector is 
harmful. However, Bobbio et al. (1998) also indicate that this is not a sufficient condition, as 
the pace of expansion as well as the social and cultural characteristics and the maturity of the 
institutions are crucial factors. Accordingly corruption is less prevalent in countries with 
institutional stability than in instable societies, as these tend to have less robust and established 
institutions. In this sense, Méon and Sekkat (2005) take a step further and analyse the quality 
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of governance associated with corruption. For these authors, the influence of corruption on 
economic growth is negative (statistically significantly) in countries with low quality political 
institutions. 
Many studies investigate the effects of corruption and their determinants, but fail to define 
which channels are used by corruption to affect the economy and the welfare of society. 
Zakharov (2019) examined the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in 
Russian regions. The author argues that corruption slows economic growth through different 
channels and identifies domestic investment in physical capital as the main channel. In addition, 
corruption fosters uncertainty (Mauro, 1995), which makes agents more cautious and leads then 
to postpone or reduce investment. This effect spreads across different sectors, resulting in a 
reduction of economic activity (Baker et al., 2016; Bernanke, 1993). 
Along the same line, Ahmed and Alamdar (2018) measured the impact of corruption and 
of the budget deficit on private investment in the Pakistani economy. They point out that 
corruption has an adverse and significant effect on private investment and stress the importance 
of the transmission channel in developing economies. 
Table 1 depicts other studies that confirm the findings described above and provides new 
information on the effects (positive and negative) of corruption on economic activity. We 
highlight the isolated effect of corruption and the interaction with public spending, especially 
military spending in developed countries and in less frequent samples, such as Peru, African 
countries, and post-communist countries. 
The lack of convergence and imprecision of the results is not only due to the complexity 
and multifaceted nature of corruption, but also to the data and methods used. The first issue is 
that many studies use the World Bank’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and ignore the 
technical recommendation of the World Bank. The problem is that the 2011 CPI scores are not 
comparable with the 2012 CPI scores, as the methodology used before 2012 means that the CPI 
scores are not comparable over time.1 The second issue concerns panel models with fixed 
effects, where Gründler and Potrafke (2019) identify that “in particular, including fixed period 
effects in panel data models does not solve the incomparability problem because the CPI in 
individual years before the year 2012 included data for different components and time periods 
to measure perceived corruption across continents”.  
In addition to the problems observed with the CPI, we must also be careful when using the 
Control of Corruption Index (World Bank) because it this index has been criticised on account 




of various methodological issues and the incomparability of a sub-index over time and across 
countries, as many country classifications come from different sources of information 
(Gründler and Potrafke, 2019). 
 
Table 1: Corruption and Economic Activity 
 
 
3. Estimation Strategy and Data 
3.1 The Magnitude of Corruption 
The literature provides different approaches to measure corruption, with one of the 
measures used as a proxy for the control of corruption being the one developed by the World 
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Bank. In addition, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is widely-used, which was developed 
by Transparency International and has the advantages of counting on a wide coverage and 
applies a consistent methodology for cross-country studies. An alternative strategy is to observe 
corruption directly, as highlighted by Olken and Pande (2012), although these authors clarify 
that their coverage is restricted and is more specific. 
We employ the CPI to measure the effect of corruption on economic activity in this paper. 
CPI classifies more than 100 countries by perceived levels of corruption in the public sector, 
ranging from 0 to 100 (0 is perceived as being more corrupt). 
 
3.2 Government Size 
There are different alternatives for classifying countries by size of government. To establish 
the presence or participation of the government in the economy, Afonso et al. (2005) divided 
the countries into three sizes (Small, Medium, and Big), according to the Public Expenditure-
to-GDP ratio (G/GDP). Small governments have a G/GDP ratio of less than 30%, medium ones 
less than 40%, and big governments more than 50%. The final consumption of the general 
government can be split into two different categories. To assess the effects of governments’ 
footprint on the economy, we use two classifications available on the World Bank database, 
namely: 1) General Government Final Consumption (% GDP), and 2) Expenses (% GDP). 
We chose these two metrics or indices because they present different aspects of government 
consumption. The General Government Final Consumption index represents the individual and 
collective services provided by the government and includes the remuneration of public 
servants, the final consumption of government goods, and services expenditures on national 
defence, but it excludes the part of government capital formation. When evaluating this 
indicator, which does not include expenses such as interest and pensions, we avoid classifying 
a government as “Big” just because it incorporates interest payments or invests heavily in social 
projects. On the other hand, and to ensure a broader perspective, the Expenses index includes 
social benefits, interest and subsidies, grants, and rent and dividends.  
In this paper, we divided the sample of the two indicators into two groups: Small and 
Medium-Big governments. Accordingly, governments with an average annual index (2012-
2018) below the 33% lowest results were classified as Small, while values for Medium-Big 
governments are above 33%. Regardless of the measures used, governments presented the same 
classifications between 2012 and 2018. 
To investigate the influences of corruption on economic activity, we selected 48 developed 
and emerging countries. Due to the lack of recent data for some countries, we selected a sample 
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that provided a good diversity of levels of economic activity and CPI scores, using corruption 
indexes from the World Bank database. Due to the change in methodology of the CPI (2012), 
the series just range from 2012 to 2019, and used the results of the comparable CPI over time. 
The data is provided by the World Bank and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. The series are based on CPI, GDP per capita (international dollar 2017), gross 
fixed capital formation per capita (constant 2010 US$)2, and labour force participation rate (% 
of total population aged 15-64 (which we call ‘Labour per capita’). We also used the 
Government Effectiveness Index (GEFF) to assess the quality of public service, as well as 
General Government Final Consumption expenditure (% of GDP) and Expenses (% of GDP) 
to rank the government size. 
Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1 present the averages (GDP per capita and CPI) for the 48 
countries, as well as the descriptive statistics and the relation between the variables. We observe 
that there is a positive relation between the reduction of corruption (increase in the CPI) and an 
increase in the level of GDP per capita (see Figure 1). 
 
Table 2: CPI and GDP per capita (2012-2019)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
                                                          




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Individual Samples (2012-2019) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index and GDP per capita (average for 2012-2019).  
 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In addition, Figure 2 illustrated the amplitude of the Corruption Perception Index per 

































Figure 2: Amplitude of Corruption Perception Index (2012-2019). 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
To investigate the transmission channel of corruption, we use the data provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the Investment Stock and Capital Stock Data (1960- 
2015). We use the corruption perception index (CPI) with private investment (gross fixed 
capital formation) and GDP, both in billions of international dollars in 2011. Table 4 indicates 
the average value of private investment and GDP for the 48 countries (2012-2015). 
 
Table 4: Private Investment and GDP (2012-2015)
 




4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Model Specification 
The GMM approach enables us to incorporate a certain superiority of the dynamic 
estimators, in comparison with the static estimators and it also controls the endogeneity of the 
lagged dependent variable in a dynamic model, especially when we identify a correlation 
between the explanatory variables and the error term. In addition, GMM controls omitted 
variable bias and unobserved panel heterogeneity. 
The empirical literature on dynamic models (GMM) tends to use first differences 
transformation (FD), which is attributed in part to the results of Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Later on, Arellano and Bover (1995) presented a transformation (forward orthogonal deviations 
or FOD) as an alternative to the first difference transformation.  
 On the other hand, Phillips (2019) argues that, initially, there would be no reason to 
worry about the transformation technique and that the results indicate that two different 
transformations can lead to the same Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. 
However, the same author also points out that in situations where the estimators based on these 
two transformations differ, the simulations suggest that the estimators obtained by FOD have 
better properties than those obtained by FD. Hayakawa (2009) suggests a similar result, 
indicating that, in many simulations, the FOD-GMM estimator performs better than the DF-
GMM model. As an additional advantage for studies of panel models with gaps, Roodman 
(2009) highlights that the use of orthogonal deviations maximizes the sample size. 
We use different configurations for the GMM model (FOD) panel, as we examine not 
only the isolated effect of corruption, but we also control for the size of government, the degree 
of development of countries, and the effectiveness of public management. Therefore, our 
standard specification of the dynamic model for GDP pc (yit) can be defined as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑋´𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑒𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡        (1) 
 
where α is a scalar and β is the vector of coefficients (kx1). In this basic structure, Yit is the 
dependent variable (per capita GDP) and Xit represents the explanatory variables. Subscript i 
indicates the countries across the time periods (t). The terms uit and et represent a composite 
error, where the random component of the variation in our independent variable is derived from 
the idiosyncratic error (uit) and the time invariant error, et. It is this term that we investigate 
when we analyse fixed and random effects, and also whether it is correlated with Xit, or not. 
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Finally, we introduce the lagged dependent variable Yi,t-1 as a determinant for the dynamic panel 
concept, and take advantage of the time series dimension. 
        Accordingly, the AR(1) α coefficient represents the persistence or memory of the process 
that affects Yit. In addition, we have identified an appropriate strategy for instrumental variables 
to deal with problems such as endogeneity. 
        In the basic configuration, we assume that the maximum sample period (t) is equal to 8 
years with 48 countries (i). To estimate our models based on the GMM approach, we selected 
the option orthogonal deviations as a transformation method to eliminate the effect of the 
specification. In addition, the GMM specification is in line with the Arellano-Bond 2-step. 
Finally, we use the CPI and labour force and gross fixed capital formation lagged variables as 
instruments (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). 
 
4.2. Results and discussion 
In this section, we examine the effects of corruption on economic activity, as well as the 
assumptions mentioned in the literature. To gain intuition, we start with an analysis of the 
average results between 2012 and 2019, and subsequently we examine the results in the light 
of dynamic panel models.  
The corruption proxy is represented by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and it 
indicates the level at which corruption is perceived by entrepreneurs and analysts, as described 
in the previous sections. Using GDP pc (income proxy), as measured by the average between 
the years 2012 and 2019, the results indicate that the higher the level of corruption, the lower 
the level of economic activity (see Figure 3). For instance, the Brazilian economy has relatively 
lower levels of GDP pc and has higher levels of corruption. We also observed that countries 
such as Portugal (which is situated below the trend line) would expect the level of income (per 
capita) to be higher. 
We initially use three dynamic panel approaches: Fixed Effects, OLS, and GMM. Although 
the focus of our study is the GMM approach, we also include the two other approaches to 
compare results and confirm patterns in the relation between variables. Unlike the GMM 
approach, one of the limitations of the other approaches is that they may not necessarily address 
issues such as the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Despite the inaccuracies in the 
estimators of these additional approaches, the results point to similarities with the outputs from 





Figure 3: GDP per capita and Corruption Perception Index (CPI).  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 5: Dynamic models (OLS, Fixed Effects and GMM). 
 















GDP pc (-1) 
1.012227***  0.837136***  0.852544***  
(0.0064) (0.0312) (0.009959) 
D(GDP pc (-1))  
0.415125***  -0.059590 
 
-0.044169*** 
(0.056) (0.0064) (0.012960) 
CPI 
-4.094788 4.743301 38.40995* 17.51332 89.62135*** 99.80616*** 
(5.96) (6.12) (21.7058) (25.5049) (12.35568) (27.96605) 
GFC pc 
0.025478 0.014999 0.194506*** -0.121659*** 0.089785*** -0.210185*** 
(0.0236) (0.0172) (0.0499) (0.0437) (0.009845) (0.008160) 
L pc 
-7.068224 -8.930793 237.0609*** 56.95920 298.6438*** 160.3550*** 
(11.94) (12.21) (51.3879) (52.3856) (21.31893) (43.01206) 
c 
852.8555 739.9850 -13893.53*** -3455.639   
(732.48) (74.64) (3584.0220) (4275.1240)   
Adj R sq 0.997201 0.213011 0.998359 0.507300   
DW 1.290723 2.364305 2.369287 2.766775   
Prob F 0.000000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
Prob J     0.221874 0.145418 
Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 332 284 332 284 284 236 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
We find that an increase in corruption (the CPI ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 being the 
least corrupt) hinders economic activity (both level and growth). The OLS approach does not 
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point to significant results, however the GMM and Fixed Effects approaches support the 
hypothesis that an increase in the CPI score (reduction of corruption) stimulates the level of 
economic activity. The same can be seen for increases in the labour force and gross fixed capital 
formation. With regards the growth of GDP pc, only the GMM model indicates significant 
results. These findings are in line with the “sanding the wheels” hypothesis (Nur-tegin and 
Jakee, 2020). 
 Moving forward, we use only the GMM approach and two sets of models3 to examine 
the effects of corruption on the level and growth of GDP pc. The first model uses the lagged 
dependent variable, CPI, and labour force pc as explanatory variables. In turn, the second model 
includes gross fixed capital formation pc in the list of explanatory variables. 
After analysing the full sample, we divided the countries according to the government’s 
spending share of GDP and investigated whether the size of government matters. Table 6 
indicates that the participation of the government in the economy interferes in the result 
(statistically significant). Thus, small governments benefit relatively more from reducing 
corruption, while countries with larger governments have less benefit. These findings are 
statistically significant for the level of economic activity and for growth of GDP (Model 2), 
where the dummy variable for the smaller government size interacts positively with less 
corruption to foster economic growth. 
 It appears that the hypothesis that countries with large governments are excessively 
bureaucratic and inefficient can be accepted. In this sense, corruption would be an alternative 
for agents to overcome these obstacles and stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, this result 
could be premature, and three is therefore a need to evaluate this evidence carefully. Maybe the 
nature of the problem is not necessarily linked to the size of the government, but rather to the 
maturity or development of countries and institutions. 
To further check if the size of the government matters, and to carry out more in-depth 
research, we asked whether, apart from the size of the government, the degree of development 
of the economies is a relevant factor. Accordingly we divided the sample into developed and 
developing economies, according to the World Economic Situation and Prospects (2012 and 
2014).4  
 
                                                          
3 In addition to GMM models with orthogonal forward deviations (FOD), we also analyse the models in terms of 
difference (DF). We found that the coefficient associated with the CPI followed the same pattern as in the GMM-
FOD model. Considering the significance level of 5%, the estimated models did not indicate a second-order 
correlation problem (AR2), neither problems related with over-identifying restrictions (validity of the instruments). 
4 Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (UN/DESA). 
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Table 6: GMM – Small and Medium-Big Governments. 
Dependent 
Variable  









GDP pc (-1) 
0.823485***  0.854384***  
(0.010887) (0.010155) 
D(GDP pc (-1))  
-0.129336***  -0.026176* 
(0.014194) (0.014563) 
CPI 
79.79164*** 93.03211*** 77.09994*** 44.83969 
(14.07795) (31.41392) (14.14976) (28.70622) 
CPI x Small 
47.20417 61.91680 55.58736* 127.2374** 
(31.86827) (54.27761) (29.74361) (56.30623) 
GFC pc 
    0.082274*** -0.221328*** 
    (0.007799) (0.008378) 
L pc 
371.7121*** 79.77400** 289.7802*** 162.8279*** 
(24.31993) (39.99011) (20.87226) (36.69898) 
Prob J 0.092747 0.081525 0.185570 0.158060 
Countries 48 48 48 48 
Observations 288 240 284 236 
 Note: small government have a Government spending-to-GDP ratio below 30%.  
 *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
 

























85.51594*** 82.78075 84.44161** 72.33343 
(20.89061) (54.23812) (34.38810) (44.04185) 
CPI x Developed 
-10.90265 229.9350*** 28.33988 435.8583*** 
(37.74435) (22.28859) (42.01884) (123.1881) 
GFC pc 
  0.032525 -0.211399*** 
  (0.033570) (0.005281) 
L pc 
447.7701*** -109.3286 257.1900*** -50.58596 
(34.24708) (122.3147) (53.13104) (71.31235) 
Prob J 0.591301 0.411155 0.497829 0.322632 
Countries 16 16 16 16 
Observations 96 80 95 79 
  *** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 




From Table 7, from the sub-group of small governments it can be seen that the two sets 
of models used suggest again that the increase in corruption is harmful to the economic activity 
(level). In addition, the findings emphasise that in countries with small governments and 
developed economies, reducing corruption has an additional positive effect on economic 
growth. The models do not point to robust and definitive evidence with regards the effect of 
economic development on GDP pc (level). 
Table 8 shows that for large governments, the control and reduction of corruption also 
fosters economic activity. However, we found no significant evidence that economic 
development interferes with the effect on per capita GDP.  
Our results indicate that corruption is an adverse factor for economic activity, as well 
as for growth of GDP pc. In addition, we find that the size of government matters, especially 
for developing economies.  
 
Table 8: GMM – Medium-Big Governments, Developed, and Developing Economies 
 
Dependent Model 1 Model 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GDP pc D(GDP pc) GDP pc D(GDP pc) 
GDP pc (-1) 
0.885445***  0.714039***  
(0.017951) (0.025853) 
D(GDP pc (-1))  
0.475149***  0.483091*** 
(0.050684) (0.047082) 
CPI 
114.4798** -42.15443 139.7204** -18.83409 
(52.16143) (45.94896) (67.50973) (47.61579) 
CPI x Developed 
-54.66990 42.30908 -87.72590 24.58331 
(53.14100) (45.91683) (65.44403) (47.15755) 
GFC pc  
 0.392423*** -0.222837*** 
 (0.038516) (0.035004) 
L pc 
286.9910*** -28.74055 388.0342*** 51.91548* 
(29.37415) (22.30198) (33.15543) (28.09346) 
Prob J 0.289537 0.215828 0.250312 0.298078 
Countries 32 32 32 32 
Observations 192 160 189 157 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
 The question brings up the dilemma presented by Alesina and Angeletos (2005). For 
small governments can be less corrupt, which thus creates conditions for an increase of GDP, 
however, they do not always address the different demands of society, as they fail to adequately 
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correct market failures, inequalities, and social imbalances. On the other hand, large 
governments respond to agents' expectations, but they can incur more bureaucracy and 
corruption. The authors point out that many policymakers accept the cost of corruption – as it 
is often the only way to reduce inequalities and generate better conditions for an economically-
vulnerable population. 
Despite the findings, we found no clear evidence that larger governments benefit from 
corruption because they are less efficient and more bureaucratic. These results are in the same 
vein as some papers which suggest the possibility of increasing the size of the government and 
thus reduce corruption (Kotera et al. (2012); Billger and Goel, 2009). In this case, the direct 
association of government size => ineffective and bureaucratic public management => 
consequent increase in corruption would not be verified. 
If the size of the government does not necessarily lead to the low effectiveness of public 
management, and therefore to corruption, then what is the correlation of the effectiveness in 
public management, perception of corruption (CPI), and government size (Gov. size)? 
To answer this question, we used another governance indicator, the World Bank 
Government Effectiveness index (Kraay et al., 2010)5. 
 
Table 9: Correlation Matrix: Government size, Government Effectiveness (GEFF), and 
Corruption (CPI) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 9 shows that the correlation between Government Size, CPI, and GEFF is around 
34% and 38%, respectively (an average of 48 countries between 2002 and 2018). The 
governance and CPI indexes have strong correlations, while government size does not have 
such a significant correlation. 
  
                                                          
5 The index reflects the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, as well as the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 




To better understand how corruption relates to the size of the government and the level of 
effectiveness of public policies, we investigate whether any pattern exists which provides new 
evidence. Figures 4, 5, and 6 highlight how the effectiveness of public management is related 
to government size and the CPI, and they support the findings of econometric models. Small 
and large governments can score high or low for corruption, and thus the size of public 
administration does not seem to be a sufficient condition. 
 
Figure 4: Corruption Perception Index and Government Size (%GDP):  
Small and Medium-Big Governments 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
A similar pattern can be seen when examining the public management effectiveness 
index (GEFF). In addition to not finding clear evidence that smaller governments are more 
effective, we note that developing countries perform worse for the CPI, which suggests that the 





Figure 5: Government Effectiveness and Government Size (%GDP): 
Small and Medium-Big Governments 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In addition, for the 48 countries, out of the 10 lowest scores for effectiveness in public 
management (2002-2018), 8 of these are developing countries. On the other hand, out of the 
top 10, a total of 9 are developed economies. 
 
Figure 6: Government Effectiveness 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Lastly, to assess whether those countries with higher government effectiveness also 
benefit more from a decrease in corruption, we classify the models at two levels: low and 
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medium-high. Therefore, scores below 33% of the lowest results of the sample mean (2012-
2019) were classified as low GEFF, with the rest being medium-high GEFF. 
Confirming the indications presented, the results suggest that countries with low levels 
of governance (low GEFF) do not achieve the same benefit in terms of economic growth, when 
compared to those that stand out in terms of the quality and effectiveness of public services. 
One hypothesis that can be considered is that corruption gains ground in countries that 
are less effective in public management, although not necessarily in those which have high 
expenditures in relation to GDP. Another hypothesis is that high-income countries benefit from 
more instruments to increase efficiency and control corruption. 
GEFF captures the quality of public services and policy implementation, based on 
perception or subjective measures which are taken from surveys of firms, households, and 
specialised analyses produced by different organisations (Kraay et al., 2010). Table 10 
highlights the effects of corruption for two groups of countries: low GEFF and medium-high 
GEFF. CPI captures the impact of corruption in countries with a high perception of the 
effectiveness of the public sector (base group), while the dummy variable computed by CPI x 
Low GEFF indicates the differential effect of corruption in countries with low GEFF scores.  
 
Table 10: GMM - Government Effectiveness: Low and Medium-High GEFF. 
Dependent Model 1 Model 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GDP pc D(GDP pc) GDP pc D(GDP pc) 
GDP pc (-1) 
0.815679***  0.852441***  
(0.010551) (0.009318) 
D(GDP pc (-1)) 
 
-0.108316***  -0.008391 
(0.011266) (0.020473) 
CPI 
70.37886*** 205.5502*** 74.33032*** 164.3753*** 
(15.91561) (35.83368) (21.80456) (52.81805) 
CPI x Low GEFF 
42.22883* -145.1455*** 31.93429 -98.17641* 
(23.93689) (43.51133) (29.57922) (56.37677) 




391.4275*** 82.71454** 301.8153*** 136.1212*** 
(24.14136) (42.08495) (22.10849) (42.78571) 
Prob J 0.068933 0.065447 0.200708 0.122236 
Countries 48 48 48 48 
Observations 288 240 284 236 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
We observe that the control and reduction of corruption increases per capita income 
(level and growth) in countries with a high GEFF score. On the other hand, countries with low 
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performance in public management do not achieve the same effect in terms of economic growth. 
These findings are in line with the hypothesis that consumers and firms base their decisions on 
the perception of government performance (Kraay et al., 2010), and accordingly agents that 
believe that the system is inefficient and corrupt can postpone or interrupt new investments, 
which consequently hinders economic growth. 
In addition, as suggested by Afonso et al. (2020), we further investigated government 
spending efficiency with two other objective metrics: total Public Sector Performance (PSP) 
and Public Sector Performance Opportunity (PSP-OP).  
First, we use the Public Sector Performance Opportunity (PSP-OP) indicator, which is 
derived from performance in areas such as education, administrative, health, and public 
infrastructure (PISA scores, life expectancy, and cardiovascular diseases are representative of 
the indicators used). Second, we evaluate the PSP indicator, which is computed as the average 
between PSP-OP and an indicator that evaluates three government functions (Musgravian), 
namely: allocation, distribution, and stabilisation (Afonso et al., 2005). 
For this purpose, we created a cross-country panel dataset, covering a sample of 36 
countries6 for the period between 2012 and 2017. Tables A2 and A3 (in the Appendix) present 
the results for PSP and PSP-OP, respectively. The results suggest that higher public sector 
performance has a positive effect on GDP pc (level and growth) for both models. 
Looking at country groups, those countries with high performance in public 
management (above the sample average) tend to perform better in terms of economic 
development (GDP pc) after they reduce corruption (see Tables A4 and A5 in the Appendix). 
By contrast, countries with low performance in the public sector have worse economic results, 
or do not benefit from the decrease in corruption. 
 
4.3. Private Investment and Corruption: The Transmission Channel 
We analysed the effects of corruption in the previous section, whilst controlling for 
different variables, without examining how the effect is transmitted to economic activity. One 
of the channels presented in the empirical studies is the negative impact on private investment. 
Despite the relevance of the topic, the literature does not provide sufficient evidence 
regarding those channels or instruments that definitively reveal the relation between corruption 
                                                          
6 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 




and investment. This negative association has been the subject of debates and studies over the 
years (Mauro, 1995), however, despite being an intuitive topic, the results to date are 
inconclusive, with some authors indicating that the effect of corruption on investment is not 
statistically significant (Shaw et al., 2011). 
In order to contribute to the empirical literature, we investigated the relation between 
corruption and private investments, by comparing different types of econometric models, 
namely: static (OLS and Fixed Effects) and dynamic (OLS, Fixed Effects and GMM) models. 
As we highlighted in the previous sections, the main focus in the literature is on the GMM 
model, however the other models confirm and provide new information for our analysis. 
As in the previous models, we analysed 48 countries and used the CPI as a proxy for 
corruption. However, due to the unavailability of more recent data for private investment, our 
sample only covers the period from 2012 to 2015. 
Table 11 highlights the results of the static models (OLS and fixed effects) and indicates 
problems of serial correlation and the insignificant effect of corruption on private investment 
(OLS). On the other hand, the Fixed Effects model is more promising, in that it suggests an 
adverse influence of corruption on investment7. 
  
Table 11: OLS, Fixed Effects, and GMM. Corruption and Private Investment. 
Dependent OLS Static OLS Dynamic FE Static FE Dynamic GMM 
Variable  Private Investment 
Priv. Invest (-1) 
 0.980407***  0.216346** 0.108511 
 (0.022838)  (0.095613) (0.305952) 
CPI 
0.308559 0.105062 1.081378* 1.313212** 1.658952 
(0.227821) (0.068092) (0.572763) (0.622329) (1.023468) 
GDP 
0.163767*** 0.010032*** 0.219284*** 0.178306*** 0.175076*** 
(0.001569) (0.003649) (0.009618) (0.023122) (0.048505) 
c 
-10.13295 -10.43711** -131.7519*** -140.6551***  
(15.18233) (4.528347) (36.77559) (40.32669)   
Adj R sq 0.982788 0.998912 0.999042 0.999463  
DW 0.063917 1.67741 1.377608 2.446389  
Prob F 0 0 0 0  
Prob J     0.355346 
Countries 48 48 48 48 48 
Observations 192 144 192 144 96 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%: * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
                                                          
7 After the comparative test, the Fixed Effects model proved to be more appropriate than the OLS model. 
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Despite providing information and confirming some patterns of behaviour, the OLS and 
Fixed Effects (static) models suffers from some issues regarding the quality of the estimators. 
On the other hand, the Fixed Effect and GMM8 models present interesting results, which 
indicates the existence of a potential transmission channel. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The phenomenon of corruption is long-lived and is present in different areas of scientific 
knowledge, being linked to the philosophical perspective and moral and political degeneration, 
as well as the effects on the economy and welfare. This study contributes to this debate by 
investigating the effects of corruption on the economy, as well its role as a potential 
transmission channel. 
The findings of our study indicate that corruption has a negative effect on the economy 
– specifically on the level and growth of GDP pc. Our results regarding the impacts of 
corruption are broadly consistent with the “sanding the wheels” hypothesis. 
We also find that the size of the government matters. Large governments register less 
benefit from reducing corruption than small governments. This isolated finding would support 
the hypothesis that large governments are bureaucratic and inefficient, and that therefore 
corruption is an option to circumvent such obstacles. 
However, this result can obscure the real reason for the effects of corruption and further 
research indicates that the level of economic development associated with the size of the 
government can provide another conclusion.  
The findings of our research highlight that small governments in developed economies 
benefit relatively more from reducing corruption than in the case of developing economies. 
Maybe this result stems from the degree of maturity of institutions in developed countries and/or 
the fact that they generally have in place more resources to inhibit and control corruption. In 
addition, large governments can have positive effects after reducing corruption. These results 
are in agreement with some studies, such as that of Kotera et al. (2012). 
 Accordingly, the large governments => high bureaucracy => high inefficiency chain of 
events and the consequent breeding ground for corruption is not confirmed. The models indicate 
that countries with low quality of public services have low responses to growth of GDP, after 
reducing corruption and that low efficiency in public management can be the main factor which 
                                                          
8 The CPI coefficient has a p-value equal to 0.108. 
26 
 
is responsible for generating conditions for corruption in order to circumvent barriers and that 
this corruption consequently stimulates economic activity. 
Finally, we find that private investment is negatively affected by an increase in 
corruption. This is an important finding, which confirms the understanding that corruption 
slows down innovations and distorts the economic system, and consequently that it is 
detrimental to economic performance. This result points to a potential transmission channel 
which negatively affects growth of GDP. 
Our study contributes to the growing corpus of research which shows that corruption 
has a complex character and that it needs to be analysed in the light of not only the size of 
government, but also of the level of economic development and the effectiveness of public 
policies. In addition, based on dynamic models (GMM - panel data), our study fills a gap in the 
literature by examining the effects of the CPI on the level and growth of GDP per capita, using 
different control variables. 
Despite its varied contributions, our study has some limitations. An important finding 
suggests that developing economies benefit from or are not affected by increased corruption. 
Regardless of the debate on the moral issue, this result needs to be treated with extreme caution, 
bearing in mind that this paper and many others only partially examine the problem when it 
comes to only investigating economic growth and that other important factors were not 
analysed, such as human development, income inequality, and poverty. In this sense, whilst 
accepting that nowadays a certain level of corruption can lead to a perpetual vicious cycle of 
inefficiencies and corruption (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005) which could even have a positive 
effect on economic growth, it must be stressed that corruption can bring a high cost to society 
in the future. 
In this sense, future research should consider alternative methods to measure economic 
performance, in addition to investigating other indexes which are capable of classifying 
government size, such as, for instance, the number of public servants per capita. With regards 
the transmission channel of corruption, it would be interesting to use a larger sample and to 
disaggregate private investment in different sectors. Finally, another suggestion is to analyse 
the effects of corruption based on the PVAR approach (Bação et al., 2019), which could 
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Table A1: Data Sources 









Private investment (gross fixed capital formation), in 
billions of constant 2011 international dollars 
Transparency 
International 
  Corruption Perception Index (estimate) 
World Bank NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $) 
World Bank NE.CON.GOVT.ZS 
General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
World Bank GE.EST Government Effectiveness (estimate) 
World Bank NE.GDI.TOTL.KD Gross capital formation (constant 2010 US$) 
World Bank SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS 
Labour force participation rate, total (% of total 
population ages 15-64) (modelled ILO estimate) 
World Bank   Government Effectiveness (estimate) 
World Bank SP.POP.TOTL Population, total 
Afonso, A., Jalles, J., and 
Venâncio, A. (2020) 
PSP; PSO-OP Public Sector Efficiency composite indicators 
 
 
Table A2: GMM - Government Effectiveness (PSP)  
Dependent Model 1 Model 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GDP pc D(GDP pc) GDP pc D(GDP pc) 
GDP pc (-1) 
0.609698***  0.563731***  
(0.020543) (0.017438) 
D(GDP pc (-1)) 
 
-0.233262*  -0.056687 
(0.121411) (0.070489) 
CPI 
73.76631** 99.53692 93.17288*** 97.07783 
(34.74565) (108.9810) (25.07952) (122.4467) 
PSP 
1352.019** 17006.00*** 1349.588* 18470.64*** 
(594.7259) (5734.751) (824.7539) (5489.416) 




712.3517*** -135.5011 496.4722*** -164.8489 
(86.80968) (264.1804) (49.85817) (249.2911) 
Prob J 0.118530 0.339620 0.175395 0.312623 
Countries 36 36 36 36 
Observations 144 108 144 108 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 







Table A3: GMM - Government Effectiveness (PSP-OP)  
Dependent Model 1 Model 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GDP pc D(GDP pc) GDP pc D(GDP pc) 
GDP pc (-1) 
0.618567***  0.564198***  
(0.025261) (0.037929) 
D(GDP pc (-1)) 
 
-0.384437***  -0.160097*** 
(0.020542) (0.029869) 
CPI 
97.04332*** 107.2535*** 95.93748*** 51.44965 
(33.25991) (34.04866) (22.58003) (42.13562) 
PSP OP 
16747.07** -1582.487 13636.68** 629.7857 
(6732.666) (9185.841) (6589.890) (9301.633) 




665.5255*** 259.0339*** 497.2616*** 315.5274*** 
(58.57603) (68.08836) (37.14735) (76.09392) 
Prob J 0.175864 0.307278 0.325130 0.365831 
Countries 36 36 36 36 
Observations 144 108 144 108 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
Table A4: Government Effectiveness: Low and High PSP 
Dependent Model 1 Model 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GDP pc D(GDP pc) GDP pc D(GDP pc) 
GDP pc (-1) 
0.549151***  0.507074***  
(0.037610) (0.020289) 
D(GDP pc (-1)) 
 
-0.395747***  -0.175278*** 
(0.013671) (0.014651) 
CPI 
149.0849** 274.6944** 180.7499*** 204.7839 
(71.61359) (122.4291) (53.24741) (138.0839) 
CPI x Low PSP 
-276.3176* -209.8556 -213.3145** -136.1927 
(143.6424) (146.7715) (96.38146) (144.0551) 




935.4435*** 409.2960*** 658.4549*** 384.2116*** 
(169.6991) (111.8371) (119.5852) (103.9162) 
Prob J 0.494430 0.357532 0.479404 0.414803 
Countries 36 36 36 36 
Observations 144 108 144 108 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 





Table A5: Government Effectiveness: Low and High PSP-OP 
Dependent Model 1 Model 2 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  GDP pc D(GDP pc) GDP pc D(GDP pc) 
GDP pc (-1) 
0.599243***  0.510982***  
(0.025469) (0.023789) 
D(GDP pc (-1)) 
 
-0.399012***  -0.177368*** 
(0.018282) (0.033183) 
CPI 
134.7779 37.28887 175.2229*** -6.980561 
(90.26518) (290.1430) (54.09895) (273.3168) 
CPI x Low PSP OP 
-104.9891 77.15909 -119.6019* 100.9540 
(102.3430) (291.2697) (61.89311) (268.0504) 




721.8096*** 302.1416*** 531.1894*** 309.5089*** 
(82.98733) (86.85223) (57.92936) (91.99260) 
Prob J 0.320220 0.560995 0.299179 0.545469 
Countries 36 36 36 36 
Observations 144 108 144 108 
*** - significant at 1%; ** - significant at 5%; * - significant at 10%. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
 
